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I.
INTRODUCTION
Although this appeal arises out of two separate lawsuits and several years of
litigation, the issues before this Court are very simple. This action arose from AIM's
attempt - pursuant to a Deed of Trust and Promissory Note - to judicially foreclose on
property to which appellee/cross-appellant James Edwards1 claimed an interest.
Although the Estate of James Edwards is not a party to the Deed of Trust and Promissory
Note, it continues to seek to enforce contractual remedies under the Deed and Note
available only to AIM and the Note's borrower, Michael Flynn. The Estate's attempt to
enforce these contractual rights must fail.
As the trial court correctly determined, James Edwards never assumed any rights
or obligations under the Deed of Trust and Promissory Note. Therefore, the Estate
cannot seek to enforce the contractual rights of the borrower. Accordingly, the Estate's
cross-appeal and opposition to AIM's appeal not only lack merit, but they are fatally
defective due to the Estate's lack of standing to enforce these contractual rights and
remedies. AIM therefore requests that this Court reverse the trial court's decision on the

1

In its opening brief, AIM referred to James Edwards, the only appellant in this
matter as "Edwards." Following James Edwards' death, his son Bruce Edwards (also a
former party in this matter) was appointed as the representative of the James Edwards
estate. In an attempt to avoid confusion, AIM will refer to James Edwards and Bruce
Edwards by their full names, and when appropriate, it will refer to the Estate of James
Edwards (the appellant in this matter) as the "Estate."
SaltLake-154037.3 0040913-00001
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limited issue relating to its denial of certain attorneys' fees, and deny the relief requested
by the Estate.
II.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Although the Estate includes seven pages of facts in its opening brief, there are
only a handful of facts relevant to the Estate's cross-appeal of the district court's final
order. AIM restates them here:
1.

On or about August 28, 1981, James M. Rothey and Beverley Rothey, as

trustor, and Mountain West Savings & Loan, as beneficiary, executed a Deed of Trust
and Promissory Note relating to certain real property located in Weber County, Utah.
(R. at 653.)
2.

The rights and obligations under the Deed of Trust and Note were

subsequently assumed from the Rotheys by Michael E. Flynn, while Mountain West
Savings & Loan assigned its rights to AIM. (Id.)
3.

James and Helen Edwards purchased an interest in the real property

through a sheriffs sale, subject to the Note and Deed of Trust. (Id.)
4.

Neither James nor Helen Edwards, nor their son Bruce Edwards, ever

assumed, or attempted to assume, the Note and Deed of Trust. (Id.)

SaltLake-154037.3 0040913-00001
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5.

Michael Flynn, the borrower under the Note, has never claimed that his

rights under the Note, including the right to notice, were violated. Michael Flynn has
allowed all of his interest in the subject property to be extinguished. (R. at 700, at p.3.)
III.
ARGUMENT IN OPPOSITION TO THE ESTATE'S CROSS APPEAL
A.

The Trial Court Correctly Concluded that James Edwards Lacked Standing
to Challenge the Sufficiency of AIM's Notice of Default.
The Estate of James Edwards seeks a reversal of the trial court's decision and a

dismissal of AIM's claim for judicial foreclosure on the basis that AIM's notice of
default was deficient. Specifically, the Estate argues that because AIM included in its
notice of default a demand for certain attorneys' fees incurred to protect its interests,
AIM's notice was defective and should preclude AIM's action to judicially foreclose on
the subject property. The Estate's argument not only lacks merit, but the Estate lacks the
standing to challenge the sufficiency of AIM's notice. Therefore, the trial court's
decision should be affirmed.
1.

The Estate Lacks Standing to Challenge the Sufficiency of AIM's Notice.

Following a two-day bench trial in this matter, the trial court entered the following
finding of fact:
Neither James, Helen [n]or Bruce Edwards (the "Edwards") ever assumed
the Note and Deed of Trust, or attempted to assume the Note and Deed of
Trust. Since they did not assume the Note and Deed of Trust, the Edwards
did not become the "Borrower" under the Note and Deed of Trust, and are
unable to claim or enforce the rights which the Note and Deed of Trust
SaltLake-154037.3 0040913-00001
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grant exclusively to the Borrower, including the right to notice beyond
what is required by law.
(R. at 653.) On appeal, the Estate of James Edwards does not challenge the trial court's
factual determination that neither James, Helen, nor Bruce Edwards assumed the Note
and Deed of Trust.2 Nevertheless, the Estate claims that it was entitled to notice with an
opportunity to cure under the contractual terms of those documents. The Estate is wrong.
As repeatedly recognized by the Estate in its own brief, the right to notice under
the Note and Deed of Trust belongs to the borrower. See Estate's Brief at 14 ("The
promissory note of August 28, 1981, requires that the borrower be given notice of any
delinquency and a 30 day period to cure

") (emphasis added); id. at 16 ("JT]he

obligor under the note is entitled to advance notice of any claimed deficiency ....")
(emphasis added); id. ("Under the terms of the promissory note, AIM was obligated to
provide the borrower with advance notice of any nonperformance and a 30 day
opportunity to cure.") (emphasis added). Because neither James nor Helen Edwards
were borrowers or obligors under the Note, they were not entitled to the notice the Note

2

In fact, the Estate never directly addresses this issue in its brief. The Estate
instead argues that the "obligor" and the "borrower" under the note are entitled to
advance notice, but fails to offer any explanation of how James or Helen Edwards, who
were neither obligors nor borrowers under the note, were entitled to the same notice. It
should be noted, however, that in an apparent effort to avoid a judgment that they were
entitled to pay AIM'S reasonable attorneys fees, James and Helen Edwards argued to the
trial court below that AIM could not recover fees against them because "the Edwards
have not signed the note." (R. at 505.) The Estate cannot have it both ways. It cannot
argue that it is entitled to contractual rights under the Note and Trust Deed while
simultaneously arguing that is not subject to any obligations thereunder.
SaltLake-154037.3 0040913-00001

4

required. This position is plainly supported by Utah law. In Johnston v. Austin. 748
P.2d 1084, 1086, 1090 (Utah 1988), a case cited by the Estate, the Utah Supreme Court
reversed a trial court which had ordered that a seller was required to give written notice
of default under a real estate contract (including instructions to cure) to the buyer and
each party claiming an interest in the property upon which the seller sought to foreclose.3
The court concluded that defendant subpurchasers, who had not been assigned any rights
under the real estate contract by the buyer, were "not in privity of contract" with the
seller, and therefore could not seek to enforce the terms of the contract. Id. at 1090.
Specifically, the Supreme Court stated: "[T]he [seller] ha[s] no legal duty under the
contract to provide the subpurchasers with written notice of acceleration as required by ..
. the contract." Id. Thus, "the written acceleration notice required by . . . the contract
needed to be given only to [the buyer] and not to the subpurchasers." Id. at 1091 (Howe,
J., concurring). Were this Court to conclude otherwise, the Court would be vesting nonparties with rights under contracts to which they have assumed no obligations. Indeed,
in this case, the Estate is not directly obligated to AIM under the Note and is not liable
for any deficiencies. Where it has no contractual obligations to AIM, it likewise enjoys
no rights.

3

Like this case, the contract in Johnston upon which the seller sought to foreclose
included a notice provision requiring him to give written notice to the buyer of his intent
to accelerate the debt and to foreclose on the property. Id. at 1085-86.
SaltLake-154037.3 0040913-00001
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In addition to lacking its own contractual rights under the note, the Estate
similarly lacks standing to enforce any contractual rights belonging to Michael Flynn, the
borrower in this matter. Even assuming that the notice AIM provided was defective,
Michael Flynn is the only party who could have challenged the sufficiency of the notice
provided thereunder. In Garland v. Fleischmann. 831 P.2d 107, 109 (Utah 1992), the
Utah Supreme Court recognized as much when it held that a non-party to a contract
could not raise a statute of frauds defense. The Court held that because the defendant
was not a party to an earnest money agreement, and was not "in privity with a party to the
contract," she was not entitled to raise the defense. Id The Court reasoned that "'[i]f the
parties to the contract as in this case are willing to waive the requirements of the statute,
a stranger to the contract cannot object.'" Id (quoting Zwaska v. Irwin. 144 A.2d 554,
557 0958)): see also Shire Dev. v. Frontier Invs.. 799 P.2d 221, 222-23 (Utah Ct. App.
1990) (recognizing the well-established principle that "only parties to a contract, or
intended beneficiaries thereof, have standing to sue" under the contract). The reasoning
is equally applicable here. Because Michael Flynn waived his contractual right to
challenge the sufficiency of AIM's notice, the Estate, a stranger to the contract, cannot
object.4 There is simply no basis for the Estate to assert the contractual rights of Michael

4

The Estate cites to no authority to support its position that it was entitled to
contractual notice under the terms of the note to which it was not a party. Instead, the
Estate relies exclusively on this Court's statements in Occidental/Nebraska Federal
Savings Bank v. Mehr. 791 P.2d 217 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) and Jones v. Johnson. 761
P.2d 37 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), to the effect that the objective of notice requirements are
SaltLake-154037.3 0040913-00001
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Flynn to notice under the Note and Deed of Trust. The trial court's decision should
therefore bt affirmed.
2.

AIM's Notice Satisfied the Terms of the Note.

AIM believes that the Estate's lack of standing to challenge the sufficiency of
AIM's notice is clear. However, even if this Court were to find that the Estate enjoyed
privity of contract with AIM and is therefore entitled to enforce the terms of the Note
relating to notice, the Estate's challenge must nevertheless fail. The Estate's challenge to
AIM's notice is based exclusively on its belief that AIM improperly included certain
attorneys' fees it had incurred in defense of the action brought by Bruce Edwards as due
and payable under the note. Estate's Brief at 17. Specifically, the Estate believes that
AIM is not entitled to collect those fees. Id. The Estate is mistaken. As found by the
trial court in this matter, AIM is entitled to include the amounts it reasonably incurred in
defending against Bruce Edwards' action in the amount due under the Note. (R. at

to "protect the rights of those with an interest in the property to be sold." Estate's Brief
at 16 (quoting Occidental). The Estate's reliance on these cases is misplaced. In neither
case did this Court decide whether a nonparty to a contract could assert a right to
contractually-mandated notice prior to the institution of a judicial foreclosure action.
Instead, this Court was reviewing the sufficiency of the notice required by statute prior to
a trustee's sale of real property. Occidental 791 P.2d at 219-20; Jones. 761 P.2d at 41
n.2. Indeed, as made clear by the Jones court, the notice requirements of which it spoke
were important because they provide protections "in lieu of the six month right of
redemption guaranteed injudicial mortgage foreclosures." Id. Because this case
involves a judicial foreclosure rather than a trustee's sale, the Estate's reliance on
Occidental and Jones is tenuous, at best.
SaltLake-154037.3 0040913-00001
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655-56). The fact that the Estate disputes AIM's entitlement to these fees does not
render AIM's notice defective.
Even more importantly, however, because AIM sought to foreclose on the
property through a judicial foreclosure, pursuant to which all interested parties were
allowed to appear and present any defenses they held to AIM's claim, AIM's notice was
more than adequate. As evidenced by the fact that this litigation proceeded for nearly
two years and culminated in a two-day bench trial, the notice provided the Estate with the
opportunity to appear and present any defenses it had to AIM's claims. The Estate's
position that it was somehow prejudiced by the contents of AIM's notice is simply
unsupportable.
B.

The Trial Court Correctly Concluded that James Edwards Lacked Standing to
Challenge the AIM's Entitlement to Attorneys' Fees Under the Note.
The Estate's second point of appeal challenges the trial court's award of attorneys'

fees to AIM on the basis that AIM did not give notice to "the note maker, subsequent
assignee, or the property owners prior to engaging legal counsel and incurring attorneys
fees and costs in the first lawsuit" brought by Bruce Edwards. Estate's Brief at 18. The
Estate's argument may be disposed of for the same reasons articulated in response to the
Estate's first point of error above.
The Estate argues that the trial court erred in allowing AIM to include the
attorneys' fees it incurred in defending against the action brought by Bruce Edwards as
additional indebtedness secured by the trust deed. Id. The Estate's argument is based
SaltLake-154037.3 0040913-00001
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again on the Deed of Trust to which it is not a party. Paragraph 7 of that Trust Deed
states: "[I]f any action or proceeding is commenced which materially affects [AIM's]
interest in the Property . . . then [AIM] at [AIM's] option upon notice to Borrower, may
make such appearances, disburse such sums and take such action as is necessary to
protect [AIM's] interests, including, but not limited to, disbursement of reasonable
attorney's fees." Estate's Brief, Ex. B ^ 7 (emphasis added). As noted by the Estate, "the
obvious purpose of this notice requirement is to allow the borrower an opportunity to
eliminate the default or resolve the threat to lender's security." Estate's Brief at 18
(emphasis added). Thus, while the trust deed may have entitled the borrower (i.e.,
Michael Flynn) to notice of AIM's appearance to defend against the claims brought by
Bruce Edwards relating to the property, the Estate was not contractually entitled to such
notice. See supra at 3-5. Moreover, the Estate, which is not an assignee under the Note,
does not have standing to challenge the sufficiency of the notice on behalf of Michael
Flynn. See id. at 6-7. Thus, the trial court's decision on the Estate's second point of
error should be affirmed.5

5

The Estate's argument on this point is particularly disingenuous given that
James and Helen Edwards, although not contractually entitled to the notice anticipated by
paragraph 7 of the note, clearly had notice that AIM engaged counsel to defend its
interest in the property. The suit AIM was forced to defend against was brought by their
son, Bruce Edwards, who they claim was their "managing agent." Estate's Brief at 19.
SaltLake-154037.3 0040913-00001
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C.

The Trial Court Correctly Included in the Final Judgment the Attorneys'
Fees Reasonably Incurred by AIM in Defending Against the Action by Bruce
Edwards.
As noted above, included in the trial court's final judgment was an order allowing

the reasonable attorneys' fees AIM incurred in defending against the action brought by
Bruce Edwards as additional indebtedness secured by the trust deed. (R. at 654-55.)
The Estate's third point of error attacks this part of the trial court's judgment on the basis
that AIM's claim for the attorneys' fees and court costs it incurred in that matter are
barred by the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and equitable estoppel.
Estate's Brief at 19. The Estate's argument fails for several reasons.
1.

The Estate Lacks Standing to Challenge Any Award of Attorneys' Fees.

First, the Estate's argument should be rejected because of the Estate's lack of
standing to raise it. AIM's right to recover attorneys' fees arises out of the Deed of Trust
to which James and Helen Edwards were not parties. (R. at 654.) Thus, as a nonparty to
the note, the Estate lacks standing to challenge an award of attorneys' fees. Indeed, AIM
does not seek to enforce its judgment against the Estate; rather, these fees are included as
part of the indebtedness secured by the note. As such, the Estate lacks standing to
challenge their inclusion. See supra at 3-7.
2.

The Elements of Res Judicata Have Not Been Satisfied.

The Estate's argument that AIM was precluded in this action from seeking fees
incurred in the action brought by Bruce Edwards is based on a faulty application of the

SaltLake-154037.3 0040913-00001
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doctrine of res judicata.6 The "doctrine of res judicata has two separate but related
branches which can be asserted as affirmative defenses." Mel Trimble Real Estate v.
Monte Vista Ranch. Inc.. 758 P.2d 451, 453 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The branch relied on
by the Estate is the "second branch of res judicata" known as "collateral estoppel, or
issue preclusion." Id. Collateral estoppel will not apply to bar a claim unless each of the
following factors are met: (1) the issue was decided in a prior adjudication "identical
with the one presented in the action in question;" (2) there was a "final judgment on the

6

Similarly, the Estate's argument that AIM's claim is barred by the doctrine of
equitable estoppel is unfounded. In fact, although the Estate repeatedly refers to the
doctrine of "equitable estoppel" in its brief, it never cites or applies the requisite standard
necessary to satisfy the doctrine. See Estate's Brief at 19-23. The necessary elements of
an equitable estoppel claim are
(1) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent
with a claim later asserted; (2) reasonable action or inaction by the other
part)' taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act, or
failure to act; and (3) injury to the second party that would result from
allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such statement,
admission, act, or failure to act.
Trolley Square Assocs. v. Nielson. 886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Moreover, the
"application of the facts to the legal standard of equitable estoppel is a mixed question of
fact and law," pursuant to which the Utah appellate courts grant "broadened discretion to
the trial court." Id. In this case, the Estate fails to demonstrate that it raised the issue of
equitable estoppel in the trial court, fails to marshal any evidence in support of a
challenge to any factual findings by the trial court relating to this claim, and fails to
demonstrate how the elements of the claim have been satisfied. Indeed, there is no
evidence in the record before this Court that AIM has taken inconsistent positions with
respect to its claim for attorneys' fees, that the Estate took or neglected to take action
based thereon, or that injury to the Estate would result if AIM was allowed to contradict
any such statement. Thus, the Estate's appeal of this award of attorneys' fees on the
basis of equitable estoppel must be denied.
SaltLake-154037.3 0040913-00001
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merits;" (3) the party against whom the plea is asserted was a party or in privity with a
party in the prior adjudication; and (4) the issue in the first case "was competently, fully,
and fairly litigated." Id at 454 (quoting Searle Bros, v. Searle. 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah
1978)). A review of the record demonstrates that these elements were not met.
First, there is no evidence in the record to support the conclusion that the issue
decided in the action brought by Bruce Edwards against AIM was identical to the one
before the court below. Indeed, the issue before the court in the Bruce Edwards action
related to Bruce Edwards' obligation to pay attorneys fees to AIM. The trial court in that
action did not grant fees against Bruce Edwards, finding that "there does not exist privity
of contract between [AIM and Bruce Edwards] such that Mr. Edwards can make
demands on the mortgage company pursuant to the trust deed note, nor can the mortgage
company make demands on Mr. Edwards to perform under the trust deed and note."7 (R.
at 74) (emphasis added).
In contrast, the issue presented to the trial court in this action was whether AIM
could, under the Trust Deed and Note, include as additional indebtedness the attorneys'

7

The Estate argues that the trial court "[b]asically . . . found that AIM was
equitably estopped by its own misconduct from recovering the substantial sums sought as
. . . attorneys fees ...." Estate's Brief at 20. There is no support in the record to support
the Estate's position. The decision upon which the Estate relies does not even mention
attorneys' fees. It states only that AIM is not entitled to recover "late fees and interest on
the past due amount." (R. at 75.) The trial court in this action therefore correctly
rejected the Estate's claims based on res judicata and collateral estoppel on the basis that
trial court's decision below was based on a lack of privity between the parties and
nothing more. See Transcript (R. 700 at pp.505-507.)
SaltLake-154037.3 0040913-00001
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fees it incurred in the Bruce Edwards action as fees it necessarily and reasonably incurred
in defending its interests in the property. AIM has not sought to relitigate the issue of
whether it can recover those fees from Bruce Edwards; rather, it litigated before Judge
West - for the first time - the issue of whether it was entitled to include the fees it was
forced to incur pursuant to the contractual terms of the Deed of Trust as additional
indebtedness secured by the terms of the Deed of Trust. The fact that Judge Heffernan
denied AIM's request for attorneys' fees directly against Bruce Edwards (who enjoyed
no privity of contract with AIM) did not preclude AIM from seeking to recover those
fees under the terms of the Deed of Trust in this foreclosure action. The terms of the
Trust Deed clearly entitle AIM to recover those fees; thus, the trial court below correctly
determined that AIM was entitled to include them as additional indebtedness secured by
the terms of the Deed of Trust.8 See Estate's Brief, Ex. B ^ 18; Skach v. Gee. 484
N.E.2d 441 (111. App. Ct. 1985) ("It is the general rule that a provision in a mortgage
covering attorney fees and costs includes not only those fees incurred in connection with
the foreclosure of the mortgage, but also any and all attorney fees and necessary expenses
8

In additional to failing to satisfy the first element of collateral estoppel, the
Estate likewise fails to satisfy another critical element - that the issue of AIM's
entitlement to these fees was competently, fully, and fairly litigated in the Bruce
Edwards' action. The specific issue of whether Bruce Edwards was himself liable for
attorneys fees was fully and fairly litigated. The issue of whether AIM was entitled to
recover those fees in a foreclosure action based on the Deed of Trust was not.
Furthermore, because the doctrine of collateral estoppel is an equitable one, it should not
be applied here at the behest of Bruce Edwards (acting as personal representative of the
Estate of James and Helen Edwards) where Bruce Edwards appeared before the trial
court with unclean hands, representing himself to be a borrower under the Note.
SaltLake-154037.3 0040913-00001
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incurred in collateral litigation in which the mortgagee may be a party by reason of his
relation to the debt or the mortgage or deed securing it.").
IV.
ARGUMENT IN REPLY TO THE ESTATE'S OPPOSITION
AND IN SUPPORT OF AIM'S APPEAL
A.

The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Award a Portion of AIM's Attorneys
Fees on the Basis that AIM Did Not Supplement Its Discovery Responses.
1.

The Estate Lacks Standing to Challenge AIM's Appeal Relating to the
District Court's Failure to Award Certain Attorneys' Fees.

The Estate argues that because of its interest in the real property, it has a right to
appear in this matter and challenge AIM's appeal of the district court's denial of
approximately $11,000 in attorneys fees. Estate's Brief at 29-30. Although AIM details
the nature of its interest, it fails to directly address AIM's argument: that the Estate, as a
nonparty to the Deed of Trust, lacks standing to challenge AIM's appeal of the denial of
certain attorneys' fees under the Deed of Trust. As explained in AIM's opening brief,
the district court held that because the Estate did not assume the Note or Deed of Trust, it
has no rights under those documents. (R. at 653.) Rather, those rights belong
exclusively to the borrower, Michael Flynn. Id Because of that lack of privity with
AIM, the Estate will have no obligation to pay the additional fees AIM seeks and
therefore has no standing to assert a defense to those claims.
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2.

The District Court Plainly Erred in Applying the Wrong Version of Rule
26(e) to this Matter.

Even assuming that the Estate has standing to challenge AIM's appeal of the
district court's denial of attorneys' fees under the Deed of Trust, the Estate's opposition
to AIM's appeal is not well founded. Recognizing that the trial court applied the wrong
version of Rule 26(e), the Estate argues that the issue of which version of Rule 26(e) to
apply was not raised before the trial court and therefore cannot be raised on appeal. AIM
disagrees. The argument raised by AIM in its appellate brief is not a new argument; AIM
clearly preserved this issue for appeal by challenging the trial court's order precluding
the entry of evidence of certain of AIM's attorneys' fees as not supported by the
discovery rules. Transcript (R. 700 at 124-25.) AIM's argument on appeal is simply
new authority for the same argument it made below.
However, even if this Court were to determine that AIM did not sufficiently
preserve this issue below, because the trial court's application of the wrong version of
Rule 26(e) constituted plain error, this argument may be raised for the first time on
appeal. The doctrine of plain error is an exception to the rule that matters not presented
to the trial court may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Cite. To find plain error,
the Utah Supreme Court requires that the error be plain, "i.e., from our examination of
the record, we must be able to say that it should have been obvious to the trial court that
it was committing error," and that "the error be harmful." State v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d
29, 35 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted). Both elements are satisfied in this case. First, it
SaltLake-154037.3 0040913-00001
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should have been obvious to the trial court that it was applying the wrong version of
Rule 26(e). There can be no dispute that this case was filed before November 1, 1999,
and there can be no dispute that Rule 26(e), as amended, applies only to cases filed after
that date. See Utah R. Civ. P. 26, Advisory Committee Notes; R. at 1-26. Thus, it
should have been obvious to the trial court that in applying the 1999 version of the rule,
it was committing error.
Furthermore, this error clearly harmed AIM. An error is harmful if "it is
reasonably likely that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings." Cal Wadsworth
Constr. v. City of St. George, 898 P.2d 1372, 1378-79 (Utah 1995). By applying the
wrong standard to AIM's obligations under the discovery rules, the trial court held AIM
to a higher standard than the law required. And, because the trial court refused to allow
AIM to present evidence at trial regarding certain of the attorneys' fees it had incurred,
AIM was precluded from recovering those fees and was therefore undeniably harmed.
3.

AIM Satisfied the Requirements of the Utah Discovery Rules: The Trial
Court Therefore Erred in Denying AIM the Opportunity to Present
Evidence of Attorneys' Fees.

In opposition to AIM's appeal, the Estate argues that under either the pre-1999
version of Rule 26(e) or the post-1999 version, AIM failed to satisfy its duty to
supplement its discovery responses, and thus the trial court properly excluded evidence
of certain attorneys' fees at trial. Estate's Brief at 23-26. The Estate is wrong.
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a)

The Pre-1999 Version of Rule 26(e)

The Estate argues that AIM failed to satisfy its obligations to supplement its
responses to James and Helen Edwards' document requests even under the pre-1999
version of Rule 26(e). Specifically, the Estate argues that "AIM had the responsibility ..
to make new computer billings available to the adverse party to update and correct the
amount of fees it would ultimately seek at trial." Estate's Brief at 27. AIM satisfied this
standard. Indeed, AIM notified the Estate that the documents would be made available.
(R. 271, 276.) That was all that AIM was required to do under Rule 34. Moreover, the
pre-1999 version of Rule 26(e) imposes a duty to supplement only "by order of the court,
agreement of the parties, or . . . through new requests for supplementation of prior
responses." Utah R. Civ. P. 26(e) (1998). As the trial court correctly found, there was
no agreement reached between the parties requiring supplementation, there was no order
requiring AIM to supplement its responses, and the Estate did not renew its request prior
to trial. Transcript (R. 700 at pp. 125-26.) The trial court's earlier order "to fully answer
and comply" with certain requests identified in an Estate motion to compel did not
impose an ongoing duty of supplementation. Similarly, the fact that the Estate had made
an earlier request that AIM generally supplement its responses does not constitute an
agreement by the parties to supplement.
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b)

The Post-1999 Version of Rule 26fe^

Even under the 1999 version of Rule 26(e), it is clear that the trial court erred in
not allowing AIM to present evidence of its attorneys' fees. Rule 26(e) must be read in
conjunction with Rule 34 which requires only that a party make documents available for
inspection and copying. See Utah R. Civ. P. 34. AIM responded to the Estate's request
for information regarding its billing records by stating that such information would be
made available. (R. 271,276.) That is all Rule 34 requires of AIM. Utah R. Civ. P. 34.
The obligations of Rule 26(e) to supplement outdated discovery responses cannot require
that a party produce documents to opposing counsel when no such obligation is imposed
under Rule 34. It can only require that the party continue to make such records available.
Because AIM satisfied this standard, the trial court should be reversed.9

9

The Estate makes much of the fact that it had asked Edwards to produce the
documents Edwards intended to use at trial. Estate's Brief at 26. These requests,
however, predated AIM's offer to make its documents available to the Estate. The fact
that the Estate chose not to take AIM up on its offer should not operate to prejudice
AIM. Moreover, the Estate argues that the trial court's decision to preclude AIM from
presenting evidence of its attorneys' fees was authorized by Rule 37. The Estate fails to
recognize, however, that before a trial court can impose discovery sanctions under Rule
37, the court must find on the part of the noncomplying party willfulness, bad faith,...
fault,... or persistent dilatory tactics frustrating the judicial process." Morton v.
Continental Banking Co., 983 P.2d 271, 274 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted). The trial
court made no such findings in this case. AIM did not act in bad faith, nor did it wilfully
disobey any discovery order of the district court. To the contrary, AIM believed that it
had complied with the Estate's discovery requests by stating that the documents would be
made available. Because AIM did not wilfully disobey any discovery order of the trial
court, the court's exclusion of AIM's billing records as evidence in the case, causing
damage to AIM in excess of $11,000, should be reversed.
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V.
CONCLUSION
Based on the arguments set forth in AIM's opening brief and this second appellate
brief, AIM respectfully requests that this Court (1) correct the reversible error of the trial
court, by allowing AIM to submit evidence that an additional and reasonable amount of
$11,456.95 of attorneys' fees and costs were incurred between July 1999 and June 2000;
(2) affirm the district court's order of foreclosure and award of attorneys' fees incurred
by AIM in defending against the action brought by Bruce Edwards; and (3) enter an
order allowing the reasonable attorneys' fees and costs arising from this appeal to be
charged under the Note and Deed of Trust. These fees and costs have been necessarily
incurred by AIM to protect its interests, and under the Deed of Trust, the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, and relevant case law, AIM is entitled to recover these additional
costs and fees. See Estate's Brief Ex. B f 18; see also Utah R. App. P. 34 (award of
costs); Valarce v. Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305, 319 (Utah 1998) (quoting Utah Dep't of
Social Servs. v. Adams. 806 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) stating that "when a
party who received attorney fees below prevails on appeal, 'the party is also entitled to
fees reasonably incurred on appeal'").
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